Do Women Directors Move ESG?
University of Edinburgh · Shareholder Value and ESG (CMSE11621) · July 2026
Does greater female board representation improve environmental and social performance? Panel FE plus a California SB 826 quasi-experiment — with a deliberate measurement design that separates real E/S response from mechanical governance inflation.
Snapshot
Main result — coefficient forest
Effect of lagged board gender diversity (1 SD)
Green points are primary outcomes (E, S). Orange points show composite and governance — largest G coefficient is the mechanical-inflation check.
Points = FE coefficients; whiskers ≈ 95% CI (1.96 × SE). Green = primary outcomes (E, S).
Economic magnitude
Coefficient as % of pillar mean
E moves more relative to its mean than S; G is shown only for measurement context.
Hypotheses
| Prediction | Result | |
|---|---|---|
| H1 | Diversity ↑ → E, S ↑ | Supported (both ***) |
| H2 | G / composite inflated vs E, S | Supported (G largest) |
| H3 | If causal, SB 826 raises E, S | Not supported (diversity ↑; E/S RF n.s.) |
Reading: robust conditional association on E and S; diversity is better read as a marker of stakeholder-oriented firms than a stand-alone causal lever. Lead–lag flags reverse causality; SB 826 first stage is strong while reduced form on E/S is insignificant.
Process
Design note
Board gender is an input to the governance pillar. Primary outcomes are E and S only. Composite and G are reported to make mechanical inflation visible — not as the main claim.
Stack
Python / Refinitiv Codebook · WRDS Compustat (SAS) · Stata reghdfe · Typst write-up
Competencies
ESG measurement · panel FE · quasi-experiments · research integrity · Refinitiv/Compustat